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VOLUME 56 WINTER 1991 NUMBER 1
Dealing With Missouri's
Choice of Law Mess
James E. Westbrook
I. INTRODUCTION
Choice of law in Missouri and many other states is a mess. The United
States Supreme Court has exercised only minimal constitutional control over
state choice of law in recent decades.' This freedom was used by many state
courts, including those in Missouri, to fashion what may be called a revolution
in choice of law. Some of the best conflicts scholarship in recent years has
demonstrated that this revolution has produced a parochial and incoherent
body of law.2 This second body of conflicts scholarship has been described
as a counter-revolution.3 This Article's purpose is to call these scholarly
* Earl F. Nelson and James S. Rollins Professor of Law, University of Missouri-
Columbia; B.A., Hendrix College, 1956; J.D., Duke University, 1959; LL.M.,
Georgetown, 1965.
1. Peterson, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Revisited, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 37,
39 (1988).
2. The following comments from a defender of interest analysis are revealing:
Brainerd Currie once remarked that Walter Wheeler Cook discredited
the vested-rights theory as thoroughly as the intellect of one man can ever
discredit the intellectual product of another.' Now Professor Lea Brilmayer
has done the same thing. By lucidly exposing the obfuscations that inhere
within interest analysis, she has performed a consummate act of "trashing"
that rivals the finest works of the most gifted critical legal scholars....
Professor Brilmayer accurately asserts that interest analysis, both in theory
and in practice, is 'pro-resident, pro-forum, and pro-recovery .... '
Berman, To Brainerd Currie: A Fallen Giant, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 529, 529 (1985)
(footnotes omitted); see also Hill, The Judicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1585 (1985); Kom, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM.
L. REv. 772 (1983).
3. Easley, An Examination of Choice-at-Law Theory and Practice in the Kansas
Supreme Court: A Historical Perspective on Rules and Reasons, 27 WASHBURN L.
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developments to the attention of Missouri judges and to make
recommendations for steps that our court may take to improve what has
become a troublesome situation. Choice of law is and always will be a
difficult and frustrating subject. There is no fail-safe method or approach that
will reconcile all the conflicting values and interests in a way that will satisfy
everyone. However, the situation can and should be improved.
II. REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION
A. Revolution
Missouri's situation can be understood better if it is considered in light
of the revolution and counter-revolution that has occurred in choice of law
thinking. During the past thirty years many scholars and courts rejected
traditional choice of law thinking.' The person who most influenced these
developments was Professor Brainerd Currie of the Duke School of Law.5
He led a scathing attack on traditional rules in general and on the First
Restatement of Conflict of Laws in particular.6
The First Restatement was territorial and jurisdiction-selecting in its
approach. It was territorial in the sense that it recommended application of
the law of the state where certain events occurred.7 In tort cases, for
example, it recommended application of the law of the place of the wrong (lex
loci delicti), defined as the place where the last event necessary for liability
occurred.8 In cases involving issues of contract obligation, it recommended
application of the law of the place of making (lex loci contractus).' If the
issue were sufficiency of performance or excuse for nonperformance, it
recommended application of the law of the place of performance (lex loci
J. 407, 407 (1988); Symeonides, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in American
Conflicts Law: Is There a Middle Ground?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 549 (1985).
4. Hill, supra note 2, at 1585; Kom, supra note 2, at 802; Westbrook, A Survey
and Evaluation of Competing Choice-of-Law Methodologies: The Case For
Eclecticism, 40 Mo. L. REv. 407, 407-18 (1975).
5. Hill, supra note 2, at 1587-88.
6. See, e.g., B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 699
(1963); Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25
U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958).
7. Professori Easley has pointed out that territoriality meant something different
in the First Restatement than it had to traditional scholars. Easley, supra note 3, at
411 n.29.
8. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
9. Id. § 346.
(Vol. 56
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solutions)."° The First Restatement was described as jurisdiction-selecting
because its rules usually located the applicable law without considering the
substantive content of that law.' Professor Currie and Professor David
Cavers convinced most scholars and many courts that jurisdiction-selecting
rules are inherently suspect. 2
The work of conflicts scholars and the adoption of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws resulted in the rejection of traditional choice of
law rules by many courts. The greatest impact has been in tort and contract
choice of law. 3 Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have
abandoned or modified the place-of-wrong rule for tort choice of law cases.14
Traditional choice of law rules have shown more staying power in other
areas. 15 Neither courts nor scholars have arrived at a consensus on a new
method or approach to replace traditional thinking. Judicial opinions rejecting
traditional rules often refer to more than one approach in explaining the
court's choice of law. 6 Courts in a single jurisdiction have jumped from
one theory to another as they have decided new cases. 17 The three most
influential new approaches in the courts have been Professor Currie's Interest
Analysis, the Second Restatement, and Professor Leflar's Choice-Influencing
Considerations.
1. Interest Analysis
Proponents of interest analysis assert that choice of law problems should
not be dealt with by general principles or rules but by determining case-by-
case the policies embodied in the purportedly conflicting state laws and
deciding which persons or entities those laws were intended to benefit.' 8
The policies are determined through the usual processes of construction and
interpretation. Professor Currie and his followers assumed that states intend
10. Id. § 358.
11. See Cavers,A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REV. 173
(1933); Easley, supra note 3, at 413.
12. Hill, supra note 2, at 1646.
13. Id. at 1586.
14. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLIcT OF LAws 318 (3d ed. 1986 &
Supp. 1989).
15. Hill, supra note 2, at 1586.
16. Westbrook, supra note 4, at 408.
17. See, for example, Professor Kom's description of the New York experience
in Kom, supra note 2, at 820-957.
18. Hill, supra note 2, at 1586; Note, Interest Analysis Applied to Corporations:
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their laws to benefit only their domiciliaries. This has been aptly described
as a "protect the locals conception."' 9  States are assumed to have a
governmental interest when their domiciliaries would benefit from application
of laws designed to afford them compensation or protection. For example, if
a guest-statute's policies are determined to be anti-ingrate and anti-fraud
against insurance companies, the assumption of an interest analyst would be
that such laws were intended to protect only insurance companies and host-
drivers located or domiciled in the guest-statute state.20 Professor Currie
maintained that often only one state would have an interest in the application
of its law. This situation was described as a "false-conflict." Currie believed
that the forum should always apply its own law when it has an interest, even
if another state has an interest. While agreeing with Currie's basic approach
and his treatment of false conflicts, many proponents of interest analysis do
not agree that forum law should always be applied in a "true-conflict"
situation.2'
2. The Second Restatement
It is more difficult to generalize about the methodology of the Second
Restatement because the open-endedness of the language in its general tort
and contract provisions - its most influential provisions - and the inclusion in
these provisions of antithetical considerations have resulted in a variety of
interpretations.22 Although the Second Restatement is two volumes in length
and contains hundreds of rules, it tends to be identified with section 145, the
general choice of law rule for torts. Section 145 recommends application of
the local law of the state with "the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6," considering four
categories of contacts.23 Section 6 identifies seven factors relevant to choice
19. Note, supra note 18, at 600.
20. For a discussion of the difficulty of applying interest analysis to corporations,
see id. at 598.
21. R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE, & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES-COMMENTS-
QUESTIONs 242 n.2 (4th ed. 1987).
22. Note, supra note 18, at n.77.
23. Section 145 reads as follows:
§ 145. The General Principle
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort
are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that
issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties
under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
[Vol. 56
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of the applicable law.24 The factors in section 6 used most often in deciding
specific cases have been the policies of the forum and other interested states
and the protection of justified expectations. Experience indicates that the
other factors in section 6 are more useful in developing choice of law rules
than in deciding specific cases. Examples of such factors are the needs of the
interstate and international systems and certainty, predictability, and uniformity
of result.
In Kennedy v. Dixon,z' the Missouri Supreme Court abandoned "the
inflexible lex loci delicti rule in favor of the rule set forth in § 145.",26 The
most salient characteristic of section 145 is its malleability. The phrase "most
significant relationship" fails to aid in making choices of law in specific cases.
The contacts listed in section 145 and the factors identified in section 6 point
to both territorial and policy considerations.
It is not surprising that courts have used the Second Restatement "in
radically different ways."27 One typical response is to incorporate some of
the techniques of interest analysis to give more specific content to the vague
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 145 (1986).
24. Section 6 reads as follows:
§ 6. Choice of Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory
directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of
the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(1) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.
Id. § 6.
25. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969) (en banc).
26. Id. at 184.
27. Note, supra note 18, at n.77.
1991]
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language of section 145. This is easily done since subsections 6(2)(b) and (c)
mandate consideration of the policies of the forum and other interested states.
Indeed, Professor Currie's writings have been so influential that his ideas
appear to have influenced most courts that have adopted any of the new
approaches. 8
Several Missouri judicial opinions have incorporated interest analysis into
section 145.29 The Missouri judicial opinions have not been any more
successful than those from other jurisdictions in using section 145 and interest
analysis, either together or separately, to explain their choices of law in an
understandable way or to guide future cases. In a 1987 analysis of Missouri
cases, Professor Abraham Wani suggested that Missouri judicial opinions
dealing with choice of law were cursory, inconsistent, and superficial.30
Although the tort and contract sections of the Second Restatement have
tended in practice to produce results similar to those produced by the use of
interest analysis, there is a clear difference in one important respect between
the approaches advocated by Professor Currie and by Professor Willis Reese,
the Reporter for the Second Restatement. Professor Currie advocated an ad
hoc, no rules approach; Professor Reese endorses a system of rules.' Not
only are there many rules included in the Second Restatement, but Professor
Reese suggested that the vague tort and contract provisions were intended as
transitional rules to be used until more specific rules are developed."2
3. Choice-Influencing Considerations
Several courts have used Professor Robert Leflar's Choice-Influencing
Considerations for guidance in making choices of law.33 This approach has
been described as a check-list method. Professor Leflar's considerations
summarize what he considers the motivating reasons behind choices of law.
He concluded that choices of law should be made after a frank, reasoned
discussion of the values at stake in a case. These considerations are useful in
28. See Korn, supra note 2, at 816.
29. See Hicks v. Graves Truck Lines, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 439 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986);
Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Griggs v. Riley, 489 S.W.2d
469 (Mo. Ct. App. 197Z); and Wani, Choice ofLaw Theory in the Courts: A Missouri
Case Study, 32 ST. Louis U.L.J. 355, 391, 429 (1987).
30. Wani, supra note 29, at 390-91.
31. Reese, A Suggested Approach to Choice ofLaw, 14 VT. L. REV. 1, 1-9 (1989).
32. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 679, 699 (1963). See also W. REESE, M. ROSENBERG, & P. HAY, CONFLICr
OF LAWS, CASES AND MATERIALS 495 (9th ed. 1990); Reese, supra note 31, at 15.
33. See the cases discussed in Hill, supra note 2, at 1617-19.
34. Id. at 1617.
[Vol. 56
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developing and evaluating choice of law rules35 and in deciding specific
cases.36 Leflar's five choice-influencing considerations are: predictability of
results; maintenance of interstate and international order; simplification of the
judicial task; advancement of the forum's governmental interests; and,
application of the better rule of law.37
The first four considerations parallel the factors in section 6 of the
Second Restatement. Both Professor Leflar and Professor Reese advocate a
dialectic between the general factors or considerations and more specific rules
in an effort to improve choice of law.38 Professor Leflar's advocacy of the
better rule of law consideration clearly distinguishes his approach from that
of the Second Restatement. The Second Restatement does not list the better
rule of law as one of the factors to be included. Leflar believes that
competing rules of law should be evaluated "in terms of socio-economic
jurisprudential standards."39  He maintains that courts always have been
influenced by their assessment of the relative merits of competing substantive
rules and that it is therefore better to acknowledge and discuss this factor
openly.40 The better rule consideration has been the most influential factor
in tort choice of law decisions based on Professor Leflar's approach.4
Scholars have noted that use of the better law consideration tends to result in
application of forum law 42 and law that favors the plaintiff.43
B. Counter-Revolution
The choice of law revolution produced a reaction by conflicts scholars
that has been described as a counter-revolution. Some of the best conflicts
articles in recent years direct a drumfire of criticism at Professor Currie's
theories and criticize aggressively the body of case law developed by courts
that have rejected traditional choice of law rules.44 These articles assert that
35. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw § 108, at 215-216 (3d ed. 1977).
36. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 267, 304-09 (1966).
37. The considerations are analyzed and evaluated in Westbrook, supra note 4,
at 427-33, 460-63.
38. Id. at 430.
39. Leflar, supra note 36, at 296.
40. Id. at 295-304.
41. T. DE BOER, BEYOND LEX Loci DELICTI: CONFLICTS METHODOLOGY AND
MULTISTATE TORTS IN AMERICAN CASE LAW 5-329 (1987).
42. Id. at 5-331.
43. Id. at 5-341.
44. See, e.g., Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without
Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459 (1985); Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth
1991]
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the choice of law revolution has produced incoherence and parochialism. l1
choice of law revolution has produced incoherence in the sense that it has led
to judicial opinions that provide very little guidance for the future and very
little help in understanding why a court made a particular choice of law.
Several factors have produced this state of affairs. The new approaches
encourage courts to consider more variables in making choices.45 Some of
the criteria used are vague and amorphous.46 The welter of theories and
approaches contending for attention confuses lawyers and judges.47 Scholars
apparently have persuaded many judges that the values of predictability and
uniformity are either unattainable or less important than other values.
Professor Hill from Columbia said "what has emerged on the judicial
plane is chaos"' 48 and "what is most striking ... is the superficiality of so
much of the judicial effort at analysis., 49 In evaluating judicial use of
interest analysis, Professor Juenger from California-Davis asserted that
"[o]verwritten opinions, replete with unfathomable terminology, bear witness
to the sacrifice of intellectual honesty which the will-o'-the-wisp approach
exacts from its users."5 Professor Korn from Columbia concluded "there
was in most quarters of the revolution a marked pendulum swing away from
'rigid and overbroad' rules and toward the antithetical qualities of flexibility
carried by some to the extreme of no-rule, case-by-case approaches to
decision.' 1 Speaking of New York choice-of-law decisions, Professor Korn
said, "I cannot think of any field of law that has in modern times become as
hopelessly jumbled as the present New York law of conflicts. 5 2
United States Senior District Judge Peirson Hall wrote that "[t]he law on
'choice of law' in the various states and in the federal courts is a veritable
jungle, which, if the law can be found out, leads not to a 'rule of action' but
to a reign of chaos. 53  Judge Buttler of the Oregon Court of Appeals
expressed his frustration as follows: "When any court embarks on a
of Legislative Interest, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392 (1980); Ely, Choice of Law and the
State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981); Hill,
supra note 2; Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1 (1984); Kom, supra note 2.
45. Kom, supra note 2, at 779.
46. Id. at 780.
47. See Westbrook, supra note 4, for an overview of the various approaches.
48. Hill, supra note 2, at 1600.
49. Id.
50. Juenger, supra note 44, at 49.
51. Kom, supra note 2, at 962, 963.
52. Id. at 956.
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determination of the 'relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states . . .' the endeavor, in many instances, is like
skeet shooting with a bow and arrow: a direct hit is likely to be a rarity, if
not pure luck. 54 One reaction of practicing attorneys to the present situation
was described by United States District Judge Jack Weinstein: "I seldom get
a conflicts decision anymore. As soon as I mention the fact that perhaps a
brief ought to be submitted, the attorneys immediately go out and settle the
case."
55
If the focus is on results rather than how courts explain their choices of
law, it is fair to conclude that the second effect of the choice of law revolution
is parochialism. State courts that reject traditional rules end up applying
forum law in most cases.56 This application is especially true of courts
which use some form of interest analysis. 7 The combination of forum
preference and expansion of judicial jurisdiction has increased the
opportunities for plaintiffs to shop for favorable substantive law.58 Since
large, national corporations are subject to suit in many states, they are
particularly susceptible to being sued in states with law favorable to
plaintiffs. 9 In addition, one commentator concluded that the systematic
failure of courts using interest analysis to recognize states' corporate-
protecting interests leads to application of "the law which imposes maximum
corporate liability."'6
Professor Korn alleges that there is an unconscious bias in modern
approaches favoring local litigants over those from other states which arises
from the assumption that a state has an interest only when its law favors local
domiciliaries and that each state is entitled to pursue its own interests.6 ' He
asserts that the "astonishingly widespread and uncritical acceptance" of these
assumptions provides "the home-team bias with an aura of legitimacy that
threatens to erode the very principle of evenhanded administration of justice
54. Fisher v. Huck, 50 Or. App. 635, 624 P.2d 177, 178, review granted, 291 Or.
117, 631 P.2d 339, appeal dismissed, 291 Or. 566, 632 P.2d 1260 (1981).
55. Juenger, supra note 44, at 28 (quoting a letter from Judge Weinstein to
Professor Juenger).
56. T. DE BOER, supra note 41, at 7-374, 7-375; Peterson, supra note 1, at 39.
This is true of Missouri courts. Wani, supra note 29, at 429
57. See Juenger, supra note 44, at 21-22, 43; Kozyris, Interest Analysis Facing
Its Critics - And, Incidentally, What Should Be Done About Choice of Law for
Products Liability?, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 569, 576 (1985); Symeonides, supra note 3, at
566-67.
58. See Korn, supra note 2, at 789; Kozyris, supra note 57, at 577.
59. Kom, supra note 2, at 798; Note, supra note 18,'at 613.
60. Note, supra note 18, at 613.
61. Kom, supra note 2, at 792, 898-903.
1991]
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itself."62 Professor Brilmayer, Dean Ely, and Professor Juenger believe the
home state preference is constitutionally suspect.'
Professor Brilmayer, one of the leading critics of interest analysis, has
concluded that it has "three discernible biases: pro-resident, pro-forum law,
and pro-recovery."' 4 Professor Michael E. Solimine surveyed all of the
published private tort choice of law cases decided by state supreme courts or
the United States Courts of Appeals from January 1, 1970, to June 30, 1988.
He concluded that the "empirical study of state and federal cases largely
confirms the charge that modern choice of law theory is pro-plaintiff and pro-
forum in orientation. "65 Professor Wani concluded after analyzing the
Missouri cases that there was a pro-recovery6 and pro-resident 7 bias and
that Missouri "courts . . . apply Missouri law more often than not."
' 6
Scholars sympathetic with the choice of law revolution often do not deny the
resulting pro-forum law, pro-resident, pro-recovery biases. Professor Berman,
for example, defended forum shopping by injured plaintiffs69 and asserted:
"I suspect that Professor Sedler and other nonrevisionist defenders of interest
analysis believe that the doctrine has worked because they share my political
view that it is all right for judges to help out accident victims by shifting costs
on to those who can easily insure."70
The counter-revolutionary scholars agree more on what is wrong with
modern approaches than on alternatives to these approaches. There are,
however, some recurring themes in their work. They oppose an uncritical
return to the rules and reasoning of the First Restatement.71 They advocate
choice of law rules instead of ad hoc analysis.7 They typically propose
rules that are narrower in scope than those in the First Restatement.73 There
62. Id. at 899.
63. Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis, supra note 44, at 459, 472-76
(1985); Ely, supra note 44; Juenger, supra note 44, at 41.
64. Brilmayer, Myth of Legislative Intent, supra note 44, at 398.
65. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. L.
REv. 49, 92 (1989).
66. Wani, supra note 29, at 428, 429.
67. Id. at 429.
68. Id.
69. Berman, supra note 2, at 531-32.
70. Id. at 535.
71. Hill, supra note 2, at 1623-25; Kom, supra note 2, at 961; Kozyris, Choice
of Law for Products Liability: Whither Ohio, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 377, 379 (1987).
72. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 2, at 1636-46; Juenger, supra note 44, at 42-44;
Reese, supra notes 31 & 32; and Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice-of-Law Rules,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 946 (1981).
73. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 2, at 1636-46; Juenger, supra note 44, at 42-44;
Reese, supra notes 31 and 32; and Rosenberg, The Comeback of Choice-of-Law Rules,
[Vol. 56
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/6
MISSOURI CHOICE OF LAW
is less hostility to traditional rules and concepts. Professor Hill, for example,
maintains that traditional choice of law practice, including traditional
jurisdiction-selecting rules, often vindicates broadly conceived governmental
interests and provides sensible solutions to choice of law problems.74
Professor Korn believes that the modem approaches overestimate the harm
done by traditional rules.75 In general, the scholars in this group support
incremental change in choice of law and are suspicious of radical change.
III. RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN THE MISSOURI
APPROACH TO CHOICE OF LAW
The counter-revolutionary scholars have made a case for reform in those
states such as Missouri which have been influenced significantly by the choice
of law revolution. There is more of a consensus in their writing on what is
wrong with modern approaches than on an alternative methodology. There are
steps that may and should be taken, however, if courts agree that something
is amiss. Although the recommendations which follow are related in various
ways, they need not be adopted or rejected as a package.
A. The Rule Adopted in Kennedy v. Dixon
Should Be Used as a Framework
for Use in Developing and Modifying
Narrower Choice-of-Law Rules
Rather than as a Means of Making
Choices of Law in Particular Cases
Missouri joined the revolution when it abandoned lex loci delicti in
Kennedy v. Dixon.76 If this is where the problems began, it is at least
arguable that reinstating lex loci delicti is the place to start solving these
problems. This, however, would be a mistake. One of the few things on
which there is a consensus among many courts and most commentators is that
the lex loci delicti rule is too broad and too inflexible. Indeed, there is a
strong consensus that choice of law in general cannot be handled satisfactorily
by a few all-embracing rules.77 There are too many different law-fact
patterns that can arise to expect that they all can be dealt with satisfactorily
81 COLUM. L. Rv. 946 (1981).
74. See Hill, supra note 2, at 1636-46.
75. Kom, supra note 2, at 962.
76. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969) (en banc).
77. Reese, Recent Developments in Torts, Choice of Law Thinking in the United
States, 8 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 181, 181 (1969).
1991]
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by a few broad rules. Professor Korn, one of the principal critics of the
choice of law revolution, praised Babcock v. Jackson, perhaps the most
important decision in bringing about the demise of lex loci delicti in this
country. 78 The choice is not solely between a few broad rules such as lex
loci delicti and the no-rule, ad hoc approach which prevails in states such as
Missouri in tort choice of law cases.
The most significant decision that the Missouri Supreme Court made
when it decided the Kennedy case was that lex loci delicti was unsatisfactory.
Section 145 of the Second Restatement was an obvious choice for a
replacement rule. Section 145 can continue to play a useful role in dealing
with tort choice of law cases. The framers of section 145 never intended,
however, that it stand alone as the sole rule for use in tort cases. Section 145
is only one of the many rules in the Second Restatement that deal with
various tort choice of law issues. Although experience indicates that section
145 can be used to decide individual cases, that same experience demonstrates
that section 145, standing alone, is not a satisfactory rule for deciding
individual cases because it is too vague and because it incorporates a reference
to factors that point in different directions.79
Section 145 and section 6 do provide a workable framework for use in
developing and evaluating relatively narrow rules for the numerous tort issues
that arise. It is appropriate to consider policy and territorial factors ard the
antithetical considerations in section 6 before adopting, distinguishing, and
modifying rules. At some point, however, this process should result in a
choice from among the competing values and rules that give more guidance
to lower courts and give lawyers a reasonable chance of predicting what law
will be applied. Section 145, standing alone, does not serve these functions.
Litigants today have to go all the way to a court of appeals or the Missouri
Supreme Court before they can know with any degree of confidence what the
applicable law will be in a high percentage of tort choice of law cases.
Section 145 provides an approach instead, of a rule.80 It identifies the factors
relevant to choice of law in torts, but it is not very helpful to trial judges
called upon to choose the applicable law, appellate judges called upon to
explain why a particular law was chosen, or practicing lawyers called upon to
predict which law will be applied.8'
Although predictability, uniformity of result, and ease in the
determination of applicable law probably are less important in tort litigation
78. Korn, supra note 2, at 960, 961.
79. See Juenger, Choice ofLaw in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 202, 212
(1969); Korn, supra note 2, at 818; Note, supra note 18, at n.77.
80. This distinction is explained and discussed in Reese, Choice of Law: Rules
or Approach, 57 CoRNELL L. REV. 315 (1972).
81. See the discussion in id. at 315-17, 324-25.
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than in many areas of law, 2 it is questionable whether law can fulfill
society's expectations if some attempt is not made to honor these values in all
areas of law.83 Sir John Salmond once argued that men's respect for law is
influenced strongly by their belief that "[j]ust or unjust, wise or foolish, it is
the same for all."'  The ideal of dispassionate justice is undermined by an
approach to choice of law that is so amorphous that there does not appear to
be much connection between the criteria for decision and the actual results.
Malleable criteria and the multiplication of decision points also can increase
costs and burden courts because of the extra time needed to research issues
and write briefs and the increased incentive to appeal provided by
uncertainty.8 The suggestion that section 145 should be used as a reminder
of the factors to consider while adopting, distinguishing, and modifying
narrow rules comes from Professor Willis Reese, the Reporter for the Second
Restatement. After explaining the difficulty of formulating definite rules for
contracts and torts at the time the Second Restatement was drafted, Professor
Reese stated "more definite and precise rules can be stated after more
experience has accumulated."86 Writing of the process of developing narrow
rules he stated: "There is no easy short cut. In each case, all of the policies
[of section 6] must be considered and a choice-of-law rule developed that will
give effect to what are the most important policies for the precise purpose at
hand.187
The Missouri cases do not indicate clearly whether the Second
Restatement should be routinely consulted on non-tort choice of law issues.88
I think it should be routinely consulted but its specific rules should not always
be adopted. Professor Hill has argued persuasively that traditional choice of
law rules should be given a presumptive effect because many of them "make
a good deal of sense in terms of the enlightened self-interest of the forum."8 9
I believe that traditional rules should be modified, retained, or overruled after
analysis of alternative rules and the arguments that can be advanced on their
82. See Reese, supra note 32, at 699.
83. See the discussion in Westbrook, supra note 4, at 449-50.
84. SALMOND, INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE OF LEGAL MEANING 1XXXi (1917).
85. See J. FRANK, AMERICAN LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM 95-105
(1969).
86. Reese, supra note 32, at 699.
87. Id. at 698. See also id. at 681-82; Reese, supra note 31; and Reese,
Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 1251, 1254 (1963).
88. Compare State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 671 S.W.2d
276 (Mo. 1984) (en banc), with Miller v. Home Ins. Co., 605 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Mo.
1980) (en banc). See Wani, supra note 29, at 419-25.
89. Hill, supra note 2, at 1619.
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behalf.90 Missouri courts should insist that the parties provide them with
alternative rules and arguments for their adoption. They should insist that the
parties explain how -the recommended rules would advance values
incorporated in section 6 of the Second Restatement. The specific rules
recommended by the Second Restatement in all choice of law areas should be
consulted.91 Parties should be encouraged to call additional narrow rules to
the courts' attention, however, because American and European scholars and
courts have developed rules that are an improvement on some of the Second
Restatement rules.92 Missouri courts should make it clear to attorneys that
it never is enough to brief only general approaches to choice of law or vague
criteria such as those found in section 145 and section 6. In tort cases, for
example, the courts should send a message that neither lex loci delicti nor
general language such as "most significant relationship" will be the sole
criteria used in all tort choice of law cases. The question should be what
choice of law rule is appropriate in a products liability case,93 a guest statute
case,94 and so on. The task of developing and refining narrow rules will
never be finished. Predictability, uniformity, and ease in the determination of
applicable law will never be fully realized because of the nature of the
problems presented in choice of law cases. The search for rules with more
specific content than section 145 will produce, however, a better body of law
than the amorphous ad hoc approach currently in use.
It might clarify my proposal to describe some of the choice of law rules
that have been recommended or adopted. I am not urging adoption of these
rules and I will not give the arguments that have been advanced on their
behalf. They are offered merely to illustrate some of the possibilities.
Professor Korn has discussed several alternatives in the area of tort choice of
law. When tort loss-distribution rules are in conflict, he argued for
domiciliary law where plaintiff and defendant share a common domicile,95
and locus law in split-domicile cases where the injury resulted from a single
90. See Easley, supra note 3, at 409; Peterson, Particularism in the Conflict of
Laws, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 973, 995 (1982).
91. See Hill, supra note 2, at 1636.
92. For examples of rules recommended by courts and scholars see infra text
accompanying notes 95-104. For an article recommending that the Kansas courts
insist upon lawyers apprising them of alternative rules and their rationale, see Easley,
supra note 3.
93. For a discussion of proposed choice of law rules in products liability cases,
see Kozyris, supra note 71, and Kozyris, supra note 57.
94. For a discussion of rules in guest statute cases, see Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31
N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
95. Korn, supra note 2, at 800.
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encounter between strangers and each conflicting rule favors the local
party. 96 He said that a respectable argument can be made for "an across-the-
board lex locus rule for all split-domicile true conflicts," 97 although he did
not end up endorsing such a rule. Professor Korn pointed out that in
automobile accident cases, application of the law of the state where the
automobile is insured would promote the reliance interests of the insured and
insurer in purchasing protection and calculating premiums. 98
Dutch Professor and Judge Ted M. de Boer argued for application of the
compensation standards of plaintiff's home state in tort cases. 99 The New
York Court of Appeals developed a set of rules for guest-statute conflicts in
Neumeier v. Kuehner."" Professor Kozyris recommended that products
liability cases should be governed by the law of the place of the intended use
of the product.'0 ' Professor de Boer gave examples of European choice of
law rules in a book in which he concluded that the policy oriented approach
of American courts "has too many drawbacks to be adopted in Europe as a
feasible methodological alternative."'2 He pointed out, for example, that
the EEOC Convention provides that "absent a choice of law by the parties and
provided that certain conditions are met, consumer transactions will be
governed by the law of the consumer's habitual residence."" °3  In
employment contract cases, the Convention provides for application of the law
of the country in which an employee "habitually carries out his work" when
the parties have not agreed upon the applicable lawY
°4
B. The Use of Interest Analysis
Should Be Decisively Rejected
It was pointed out earlier that Missouri Courts of Appeals have
sometimes incorporated interest analysis into section 145 of the Second
Restatement.0 5 These courts sought help in deciding which state had the
most significant relationship by considering the governmental interests of
contending states.1x 6 Interest analysis seeks a case by case determination of
96. Id. at 800, 801.
97. Id. at 967.
98. Id. at 882, 883.
99. T. DE BOER, supra note 41, at 1-73.
100. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
101. Kozyris, supra note 71, at 383.
102. T. DE BOER, supra note 41, at 500.
103. Id. at 1-46.
104. Id.
105. See cases cited in supra note 29.
106. See, supra, text accompanying notes 27-30. For cases from other
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the spatial reach of a substantive rule by identifying the policy behind the rule
and determining who that policy was designed to cover. 7 It assumes states
intend that their compensatory and protective policies should benefit only their
residents.'08 I submit that the experience of Missouri and other states with
interest analysis indicates that the Missouri Supreme Court should send a clear
message to the lower courts that interest analysis is not an acceptable means
of choosing the applicable law, either alone or in combination with provisions
of the Second Restatement. Brainerd Currie wrote brilliantly about choice of
law, but in practice his approach has led to confusion in judicial opinions and
parochialism in the results reached by courts. Interest analysis has failed in
practice in part because it is difficult if not impossible to identify the policies
behind legal rules in a consistent, predictable manner. Brainerd Currie said
this should be done by the ordinary processes of statutory construction and
interpretation. This sounds easy, but an examination of the decisions of
almost any state which has resorted to interest analysis shows that it has
turned out to be frustratingly difficult. One of the best known illustrations of
this is the series of cases in which the New York Court of Appeals tried to
determine the policy behind guest statutes. In Babcock v. Jackson,"°' the
court said the policy was preventing fraud against insurance companies. In
Dym v. Gordon,"° the court said these statutes are designed to promote anti-
fraud and anti-ingrate policies and to give priority of payment to injured non-
guests. In Tooker v. Lopez,"' the court repudiated the notion that one of the
guest statute policies is priority for the non-guest. In Neumier v. Kuehner, the
court said further research "has revealed the distinct possibility that ...
perhaps the only purpose ... was to protect owners and drivers against suits
by ungrateful guests. 012 One scholar's research led him to conclude that
the Ontario guest statute's only purpose was to protect insurance
companies."
jurisdictions which have invoked the Second Restatement to justify using interest
analysis, see Note, supra note 18, at n.77. For criticism of this practice, see Reppy,
Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34 MERCER L. REV.
645, 656-66 (1983).
107. See Hill, supra note 2, at 1590-92.
108. Note, supra note 18, at 600.
109. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482-83, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750
(1963).
110. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 124,209 N.E. 2d 792,794,262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (1965).
111. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 576, 249 N.E.2d 394, 398, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 525 (1969).
112. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 124, 286 N.E.2d 454, 455, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 67 (1972).
113. Baade, The Case of the Disinterested Two States: Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1
HOFSTRA L. REV. 150, 152-54 (1973).
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Why is it so difficult to identify policies? Many legal rules have more
than one purpose. In part, this results from the fact that statutes and court
decisions usually are a product of compromise."' Interest analysis does not
provide a way to choose between these policies." 5 Moreover, each legal
rule exists in a body of related rules which incorporate policies which may
conflict with the policy which underlies the rule in question.116 Another
source of difficulty is the absence in many states of committee reports and
legislative debates. Even if information is available, it may show that
legislators voted for a bill for a variety of reasons.
Some scholars assert that neither courts nor interest analysis scholars are
as interested in the real policies underlying statutes and common law decisions
as in using the play in the joints of the system to reach a result they like.
Professor de Boer concluded that "many of the decisions . . . give the
impression of being geared to a 'just result' irrespective of the policies and
interests involved. 117 In Professor Juenger's view, reliance on policies and
interests permits judges "to reach any conclusion they choose."" S Professor
Brilmayer maintains that "all of this talk about willingness to defer to state
policy decisions is pure bunk"1 9 and that the goal of interest analysis
scholars is to implement "the policies of a select group of choice of law
scholars, not the policy choices of those legal institutions empowered to adopt
and interpret state law."' 20
Interest analysis is also suspect because it promotes the wrong goals.
The goal of a choice of law approach should be achieving conflicts justice
between litigants' and mitigating the hardships created by the legal
diversity of our federal system, 122 not promoting governmental interests.
These goals can be promoted best by an approach that respects simplicity,
multistate harmony and predictability. Professor Hill asserted that interest
analysis ignores the interests of states as a member of the community of
states." Professor Juenger argued that the only real governmental interests
114. Juenger, supra note 44, at 33.
115. Id. at 33, 34. For a contrary view, see Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 301 (1990).
116. W. REESE, M. ROSENBERG & P. HAY, supra note 32, at 548.
117. T. DE BOER, supra note 41, at 9-458.
118. Juenger, supra note 44, at 49.
119. Brilmayer, supra note 44, at 469.
120. Id. at 472.
121. See Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277,
1285, 1301, 1306, 1311, 1318, 1319 (1989); Kom, supra note 2, at 965, 966.
122. See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 453-55.
123. Hill, supra note 2, at 1597.
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are fiscal and proprietary interests such as revenue and water rights.
Professor Brilmayer pointed out that when state legislatures adopt statutes
dealing with choice of law issues, they are motivated by a desire to achieve
predictability and multistate harmony, and that these statutes give no
significant support for the interest analysts' premise that "compensatory and
protective policies are designed to benefit only forum residents."' If the
emphasis is placed on conflicts justice between litigants, more attention should
be given to whether defendants have affiliated themselves with a state in a
way that justifies or makes it fair to apply that state's law to them.12 6 If the
emphasis is placed on mitigating the hardships created by the legal diversity
of our federal system, more attention should be given to predictability and the
delays and costs associated with legal uncertainty. 127  Interest analysis
ignores these considerations.
C. Missouri Courts Should Make a Conscious
Choice Between Both Content Neutral and Result
Selective Choice of Law Rules
Choices of law can be made by engaging in ad hoc analysis or by relying
upon rules. Choice of law rules can be content neutral or result selective. 128
Content neutral choice of law rules, also described as jurisdiction selecting
rules, choose the applicable law without regard to the substantive content of
the chosen rule. Result selective choice of law rules choose the applicable
law through conscious consideration of the end result that will be achieved by
application of a particular rule. Lex loci delicti is a content neutral choice of
law rule; the better rule consideration urged by Professor Leflar is result
selective. Use of lex loci delicti enables a court to choose the applicable tort
rule without considering the content of the competing rules. If the choice is
made by deciding which of the competing rules is better, it will be necessary
124. Juenger, Governmental Interests - Real and Spurious - in Multistate
Disputes, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 515, 519-28 (1988). Professor Sedler's argument
against this position can be found in Sedler, Professor Juenger's Challenge to the
Interest Analysis Approach to Choice-of-Law: An Appreciation and A Response, 23
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 865, 875-80 (1990).
125. Brilmayer, supra note 64, at 424.
126. See Brilmayer, supra note 121, at 1289, 1306, 1318, 1319; Dane, Vested
Rights, "Vestedness," and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191, 1245 (1987); Korn,
supra note 2, at 959.
127. See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 409 for discussion of some of the problems
associated with legal uncertainty.
128. See Sedler, supra note 124, at 867-75.
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to compare their substantive merits and the court will simultaneously select
a result and the law that achieves that result.
Jurisdiction selecting rules have a long history and are still widely
used.129  They have been under attack by scholars for years, 3 ' but
counterrevolutionary scholars have begun making the case for their utility. 3'
Jurisdiction selecting rules, while subject to manipulation'32 like all legal
rules, promote predictability more effectively and are easier to use than an
approach which relies on policy analysis. Jurisdiction selecting rules need not
be based upon abstract concepts like vested rights. Professor de Boer, for
example, recommends a method of jurisdiction selection which he calls
functional allocation. 33  Under this approach, the choice of law rule is
formulated on the basis of an a priori identification of the jurisdiction thought
to be most concerned with the issue. 34 For example, since legislation aimed
at protecting consumers is presumably enacted to benefit a state's habitual
residents, an appropriate choice of law rule would apply the law of the
consumer's habitual residence to disputes involving consumer
transactions.135
The law of the habitual residence, however, is chosen irregardless of
whether it helps or hurts the resident in the particular case. It is thus a
jurisdiction selecting rule because no consideration is given to the content of
the rule chosen or which party the rule favors.
Result selecting rules can indicate rather specifically in advance which
result is favored or they can impose on courts an obligation to select a
preferred result case by case through application of very general criteria. An
example of the first kind of result selective rule would be one calling for the
"more fully compensating tort law.' 136 Examples of the second kind would
be Professor Leflar's better rule consideration and Professor Juenger's "most
suitable rule of decision" rule for mass disasters. 7 If a court were called
upon to decide between the law of a state with ceilings on the damages that
129. F. JUENGER, GENERAL COURSE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 163
(1983).
130. See, e.g., Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L.
REV. 173 (1933).
131. See T. DE BOER, supra note 41, at 9-495; Hill, supra note 2, at 1636-46; and
Kom, supra note 2, at 962.
132. See Westbrook, supra note 4, at 418.
133. T. DE BOER, supra note 41, at 1-43.
134. Id. at 9-494, 9-495.
135. Id. at 1-46.
136. Morrison, Death of Conflicts, 29 VILL. L. REv. 313, 338 (1983).
137. Juenger, Mass Disasters and the Conflict ofLaws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105,
1991]
19
Westbrook: Westbrook: Dealing with Missouri's Choice
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
can be recovered from health care providers and the law of a state with no
ceilings, the rule requiring application of the "more fully compensating tort
law" would be relatively easy to apply. The parties could predict with some
confidence before trial which law would be applied. If Leflar's better rule
consideration were used, however, the trial and appellate courts would have
to consider the competing socio-economic-legal arguments and the parties
would not know the governing law with any confidence until after completion
of an appeal.
Missouri courts do not have to decide in advance whether they prefer
content neutral or result selective choice of law rules. In adopting and
modifying choice of law rules to deal with various areas of law, however,
Missouri courts should consider in each instance the arguments for both kinds
of rules. The Second Restatement includes both kinds of choice of law rules.
For example, section 223 recommends application of situs law when the
question is the validity of a conveyance of interest in land. This is a content
neutral, jurisdiction selecting rule.138 When the question is which usury
statue applies, section 203 of the Second Restatement recommends a carefully
hedged preference for the law that would uphold the contract in the face of a
usury charge. 139 This is a result selective rule of the first kind described
above. Result selective rules such as section 203 are most apt to be used in
areas of the law in which there is a consensus among states on basic policy
but disagreement over details.
Professor Leflar's better rule consideration is not the only available
approach to case by case result selection, but the fact that it is well known and
has been used by some courts140 makes it the leading candidate for use by
Missouri courts if they should decide to try case by case result selection.
Professor Leflar's writings do not advocate sole reliance upon the better rule
consideration. It is one of several considerations. In practice, however, the
better rule consideration tends to crowd out the other considerations and
become decisive. Thus, it seems fair to use Professor Leflar's approach as an
example of case by case result selection. It is harder to dismiss case by case
result selection than it is to dismiss interest analysis. If one assumes as I do
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 223 (1986).
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 203 (1986) reads as
follows:
§ 203. Usury
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of usury if
it provides for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to which the
contract has a substantial relationship and is not greatly in excess of the rate
permitted by the general usury law of the state of the otherwise applicable
law under the rule of § 188.
140. See cases cited in Hill, supra note 2, at 1617-19.
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that interest analysis as practiced by courts is often simply disguised case by
case result selection, use of the better rule consideration at least has the virtue
of frankness. Moreover, since courts in wholly domestic cases quite properly
consider the substantive merits of legal rules in deciding whether to adopt,
extend or limit the rules, there is an intuitive appeal in doing so in choice of
law cases.
Why then have some commentators criticized the better rule
approach?' The objections tend to be based on different conceptions of
the role of courts and the differences between wholly domestic and choice of
law cases. Those who stress the importance of uniform application of the law,
predictability, and ease in the determination of the law, tend to react
negatively to the subjectivity and variability implicit in a better rule
approach.'42 Professor de Boer, for example, said, "If it were to be used as
an overriding choice of law criterion, it would become a license for
undisguised Kadi-Justiz, and that is why it should be rejected out of
hand.' 43 Those who question case by case result selection may wonder
how judges can eschew disinterestedness in choice of law without also
accepting the notion of preferring favored classes of litigants whenever they
appear in court.'" The critics of case by case result selection also tend to
believe that the role of judges in promoting various substantive policies and
goals should be more circumscribed in choice of law cases than in wholly
domestic cases. It has been argued that it is unfair to further favored policies
by applying the adverse laws of a state to a party who has not in some way
associated herself with the state. 45 Professor Brilmayer asserted:
In the choice of law context the purported justifications for a system of
adjudication that maximizes the total good to society are least persuasive.
... Whatever the merits of adjudicative efforts to further social policy, one
cannot simply take for granted the fairness of using the litigant in a
multistate case as a means to that end.146
141. For examples of critical commentary, see T. DE BOER, supra note 41, at
5-343, 5-347, 9-489; Kom, supra note 2, at 958-960; Westbrook, supra note 4, at
460-462.
142. Professor Juenger, however, believes that result selectivity could lead to
greater consistency. Juenger, supra note 129, at 287-88. This assumption is
challenged in Sedler, supra note 124, at 895-902 (1990).
143. T. DE BOER, supra note 41, at 9-489.
144. See Dane, supra note 126, at 1244.
145. See Kom, supra note 2, at 966.
146. Brilmayer, supra note 121, at 1293, 1294.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Article recommends the development wherever possible of narrow
choice of law rules through examination of the considerations in section 6 of
the Second Restatement of Conflicts and careful comparison of existing
precedent, the rules contained in the Second Restatement, and rules developed
by scholars and courts from other states and nations.147 It urges Missouri
courts to refrain from using interest analysis as a way of deciding which state
has the most significant relationship to an issue in a case.
I believe changes are needed because Missouri choice of law decisions
in recent years have neglected the values of disinterestedness, predictability,
uniformity of result, and ease in the determination of applicable law. Sections
145 and 6 of the Second Restatement, adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court
in Kennedy v. Dixon,'48 can be helpful in developing more specific rules, but
they do not provide much guidance in dealing with particular cases. The
attempt to use interest analysis in applying section 145 has made the situation
worse. A judge interested in evaluating current Missouri precedent in this
area should read Hicks v. Graves Truck Lines,149 Carver v. Schafer,'"O and
Griggs v. Riley,' 5' and ask whether a reading of these opinions would assist
or impede an attorney or trial judge in deciding upon the applicable law in a
tort case. I do not fault the authors of those opinions; I fault some of the
scholarly literature that they relied upon. The judges involved in those cases
looked around for help in dealing with some of the most difficult problems in
the law and, in my opinion, they received bad advice.
Missouri choice of law decisions since Kennedy v. Dixon152 have shown
a pro-forum law and pro-plaintiff bias. A case can be made for these
preferences, but Missouri courts should at least be forthright about their
preferences if this is going to be a deliberate policy. Explicit adoption of
result selective choice of law rules would accomplish this. Before adopting
explicit plaintiff-favoring choice of law rules, 153 however, Missouri judges
should ask themselves whether an across-the-board preference is appropriate
147. Compare the recommendation directed to Kansas courts in Easley, supra note
3, at 409, 452.
148. 439 S.W.2d 173, 184 (Mo. 1969) (en banc).
149. 707 S.W. 2d 439 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
150. 647 S.W. 2d 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
151. 489 S.W. 2d 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
152. Note, supra note 18, at 613-15.
153. For a discussion of how this could be accomplished, see R. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 284-85, 360 (3d ed. 1986).
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in a time when there seems to be a trend toward limiting liability and
damages. 4
The Missouri courts should realize that adoption of the course of action
recommended in this Article will not eliminate the uncertainty and frustration
experienced by lawyers and judges when they deal with choice of law. While
there is room for real improvement, no scholar or judge will ever develop an
approach that will reconcile all the irreconcilables inherent in this field. 15
Reflecting on his study of policy oriented choice of law, Professor de Boer
concluded as follows:
[F]or a long time I kept secretly hoping that the philosopher's stone of
conflicts methodology would be hidden somewhere in the multitude of
policy-oriented cases. Gradually it dawned on me that I would never find
it, and that no one ever will. It is in the nature of conflicts law that its
solutions will always be found wanting. 5
6
Missouri judges should also realize that rejection of interest analysis and
an effort to develop rules that place more emphasis on uniformity,
predictability and ease of determination will result in criticism from some
conflicts scholars. If that should happen, I would urge them to accept such
criticisms with equanimity and to redouble their efforts to mitigate as best
they can the problems created for business persons, consumers, injured
persons, practicing attorneys, trial judges, and others by the legal diversity of
our federal system. Give these persons guidance where possible and ask
whether it is fair to subject a person or entity to a particular state's laws
instead of asking whether application of those laws will further that state's
domestic policies. This approach will not solve all the problems in this field.
It at least pursues the right goals.
154. Priest, The Current Insurance Crises and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521, 1587-88 and nn.257-62 (1987).
155. For a discussion of why this is the case, see Westbrook, supra note 4, at
440-47.
156. DE BOER, supra note 41, at 9-498.
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